Patent application number | Description | Published |
20080235754 | Methods and apparatus for enforcing launch policies in processing systems - A processing system has a processing unit, nonvolatile storage, and secure nonvolatile memory with inherent access control. The nonvolatile storage includes an authenticated code (AC) module, a launch policy setting, and a second code module. The secure nonvolatile memory includes an integrity metric for the launch policy setting. When executed by the processing unit, the AC module computes a new integrity metric for the launch policy setting, and uses the new integrity metric for the launch policy setting and the integrity metric for the launch policy setting to determine whether the launch policy setting should be trusted. The AC module may also compute a new integrity metric for the second code module, and may use the launch policy setting and the new integrity metric for the second code module to determine whether the second code module should be allowed to execute. | 09-25-2008 |
20080244261 | SEPARATION OF LOGICAL TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULES WITHIN A SINGLE PHYSICAL TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE - A device, method, and system are disclosed. In one embodiment, the device includes storage to contain more than one trust root, and logic to associate each command ordinal sent to the device with one of the trust roots. | 10-02-2008 |
20090044187 | Methods And Apparatus For Creating An Isolated Partition For A Virtual Trusted Platform Module - A data processing system isolates a virtual trusted platform module (vTPM) manager in the processing system from other management software in the processing system. In one example process, the processing system launches a virtual machine monitor (VMM) that includes a memory-mapped input/output (MMIO) trap. The processing system also launches a vTPM manager in a first virtual machine (VM). In addition, the processing system launches a second VM to contain virtual machine management programs other than the vTPM manager and the MMIO trap. Other embodiments are described and claimed. | 02-12-2009 |
20090086979 | VIRTUAL TPM KEYS ROOTED IN A HARDWARE TPM - The present subject matter related to trusted computing, and more particularly, to virtual trusted platform module keys rooted in a hardware trusted platform module. Some embodiments include a trusted platform virtualization module operable to capture virtual machine trusted platform module calls and operates to generate, maintain, and utilize hardware trusted platform module keys on behalf of the one or more virtual machines. Some embodiments include virtual trusted platform module keys having a public portion on top of an private portion including an encrypted hardware trusted platform module key. | 04-02-2009 |
20090089582 | METHODS AND APPARATUS FOR PROVIDING UPGRADEABLE KEY BINDINGS FOR TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULES - A processing system with a trusted platform module (TPM) supports migration of digital keys. For instance, an application in the processing system may create a first configuration key as a child of a TPM storage root key (SRK) when the processing system has a first configuration. The application may also create an upgradable root user key associated with an upgrade authority as a child of the first configuration key. The application may also create a user key as a child of the upgradable root user key. When the processing system has a second configuration, the application may create a second configuration key as a child of the SRK. The application may request migration approval from the upgrade authority. In response to receiving the approval from the upgrade authority, the application may migrate the root user key to be a child of the second configuration key. Other embodiments are described and claimed. | 04-02-2009 |
20090133097 | Device, system, and method for provisioning trusted platform module policies to a virtual machine monitor - A method, apparatus and system for a trusted platform module accepting a customized integrity policy provisioned to a virtual machine monitor, verifying the security of a first policy object, for example, including the customized integrity policy, by comparing a counter associated with the first policy object with a counter associated with a second policy object, and customizing a virtual trusted platform module of the virtual machine monitor according to the first policy object, for example, when the first policy object is verified. The customized integrity policy may include user specified configurations for implementing a customized virtual environment. Other embodiments are described and claimed. | 05-21-2009 |
20090169012 | VIRTUAL TPM KEY MIGRATION USING HARDWARE KEYS - The present subject matter is related to trusted computing, and more particularly to migration of virtual trusted platform module keys that are rooted in a hardware trusted platform module. Some embodiments include a trusted platform virtualization module that may perform one or more of inbound and outbound trusted platform module key migrations. Such migrations may be performed between a virtual trusted platform module and either a hardware or a virtual trusted platform module. | 07-02-2009 |
20090169017 | CONFIGURATION OF VIRTUAL TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE - Systems, methods and machine readable media for configuring virtual platform modules are disclosed. One method includes launching a virtual machine monitor, and determining, with the virtual machine monitor, whether a configuration policy that defines a configuration for a virtual trusted platform module is trusted. The method further includes configuring the virtual trusted platform module per the configuration policy in response to the virtual machine monitor determining that the configuration policy is trusted. The method also includes launching, via the virtual machine monitor, a virtual machine associated with the virtual trusted platform module. | 07-02-2009 |
20120030730 | PROVIDING A MULTI-PHASE LOCKSTEP INTEGRITY REPORTING MECHANISM - In one embodiment, a processor can enforce a blacklist and validate, according to a multi-phase lockstep integrity protocol, a device coupled to the processor. Such enforcement may prevent the device from accessing one or more resources of a system prior to the validation. The blacklist may include a list of devices that have not been validated according to the multi-phase lockstep integrity protocol. Other embodiments are described and claimed. | 02-02-2012 |
20120163589 | SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR IMPLEMENTING A TRUSTED DYNAMIC LAUNCH AND TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE (TPM) USING SECURE ENCLAVES - An apparatus and method are described for implementing a trusted dynamic launch and trusted platform module (TPM) using a secure enclave. For example, a computer-implemented method according to one embodiment of the invention comprises: initializing a secure enclave in response to a first command, the secure enclave comprising a trusted software execution environment which prevents software executing outside the enclave from having access to software and data inside the enclave; and executing a trusted platform module (TPM) from within the secure enclave, the trusted platform module securely reading data from a set of platform control registers (PCR) in a processor or chipset component into a memory region allocated to the secure enclave. | 06-28-2012 |
20130232345 | System and Method for Implementing a Trusted Dynamic Launch and Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Using Secure Enclaves - An apparatus and method are described for implementing a trusted dynamic launch and trusted platform module (TPM) using a secure enclave. For example, a computer-implemented method according to one embodiment of the invention comprises: initializing a secure enclave in response to a first command, the secure enclave comprising a trusted software execution environment which prevents software executing outside the enclave from having access to software and data inside the enclave; and executing a trusted platform module (TPM) from within the secure enclave, the trusted platform module securely reading data from a set of platform control registers (PCR) in a processor or chipset component into a memory region allocated to the secure enclave. | 09-05-2013 |
20130283369 | Providing A Multi-Phase Lockstep Integrity Reporting Mechanism - In one embodiment, a processor can enforce a blacklist and validate, according to a multi-phase lockstep integrity protocol, a device coupled to the processor. Such enforcement may prevent the device from accessing one or more resources of a system prior to the validation. The blacklist may include a list of devices that have not been validated according to the multi-phase lockstep integrity protocol. Other embodiments are described and claimed. | 10-24-2013 |
20130347058 | Providing Geographic Protection To A System - In one embodiment, a method includes determining a location of a system responsive to location information received from at least one of a location sensor and a wireless device of the system, associating the location with a key present in the system to generate an authenticated location of the system, and determining whether the authenticated location is within a geofence boundary indicated in a location portion of a launch control policy (LCP) that provides a geographic-specific policy. Other embodiments are described and claimed. | 12-26-2013 |
20140047229 | USING A TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE FOR BOOT POLICY AND SECURE FIRMWARE - Embodiments of apparatuses and methods for using a trusted platform module for boot policy and secure firmware are disclosed. In one embodiment, a trusted platform module includes a non-volatile memory, a port, and a mapping structure. The port is to receive an input/output transaction from a serial bus. The transaction includes a system memory address in the address space of a processor. The mapping structure is to map the system memory address to a first location in non-volatile memory. | 02-13-2014 |
20140250291 | CONTINUATION OF TRUST FOR PLATFORM BOOT FIRMWARE - This disclosure is directed to continuation of trust for platform boot firmware. A device may comprise a processing module and a memory module including read-only memory (ROM) on which is stored platform boot firmware. On activation, the processing module may load the platform boot firmware. The platform boot firmware may cause the processing module to first load a trusted pre-verifier file to load and verify the signature of a hash table loaded from the platform boot firmware. The processing module may then load firmware program files from the platform boot firmware, calculate a hash for each file, and verify whether each program hash is in the hash table. Firmware program files with hashes in the hash table may be allowed to execute. If any firmware program file hash is not in the hash table, the processing module may perform platform specific security actions to prevent the device from being compromised. | 09-04-2014 |
20140359754 | Providing A Multi-Phase Lockstep Integrity Reporting Mechanism - In one embodiment, a processor can enforce a blacklist and validate, according to a multi-phase lockstep integrity protocol, a device coupled to the processor. Such enforcement may prevent the device from accessing one or more resources of a system prior to the validation. The blacklist may include a list of devices that have not been validated according to the multi-phase lockstep integrity protocol. Other embodiments are described and claimed. | 12-04-2014 |
20150059007 | Launching A Secure Kernel In A Multiprocessor System - In one embodiment of the present invention, a method includes verifying a master processor of a system; validating a trusted agent with the master processor if the master processor is verified; and launching the trusted agent on a plurality of processors of the system if the trusted agent is validated. After execution of such a trusted agent, a secure kernel may then be launched, in certain embodiments. The system may be a multiprocessor server system having a partially or fully connected topology with arbitrary point-to-point interconnects, for example. | 02-26-2015 |